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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the development of Demand Side Response (DSR) in the context of smart 
grid initiatives on regional distribution networks in the UK. DSR is an emerging approach to augment 
asset management in the electricity sector, where network capacity is acquired from demand side 
actors who reduce their electricity demand at peak times by using their own generators or by shifting 
electricity consumption outside peak periods. DSR has a different institutional arrangement compared 
to conventional network reinforcement, since capacity is acquired via commercial and contractual 
arrangements rather than ownership and property rights. Thus, we cast DSR as an institutional 
innovation and identify important actors in such developments. Key among these are ‘aggregators’ 
who are companies that aggregate the DSR capacity from a number of commercial customers to 
provide capacity for the Distribution Network Operator (DNO.) Exploratory case study research was 
conducted as part of a smart grid initiative, with a particular focus on the work of aggregators.  Our 
findings identify aggregators as intermediary agents situated between utility firms and customers with 
DSR capacity and brokering relationships between them. Aggregators create receptivity for DSR by 
identifying potential adopters of DSR and construct persuasive and pervasive propositions that 
renders DSR a valid energy management initiative that accords with an organisation’s business 
priorities and institutional arrangements. It is through this process that aggregators are important 
actors who facilitate and create a tighter fit between DSR and the contexts in which it is deployed.  
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1 Introduction 
Smart grids are promoted in the UK and other countries to address a number of challenges in energy 
supply and demand, which include decarbonisation of the electricity system, ageing infrastructure and 
to ensure affordable power (1, 2, 3, 4). An overall smart grids approach is defined by the European 
Commission as “an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions of all users 
connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both in order to efficiently deliver 
sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies” (1). Following this broad definition, transitions 
to smart grids are socio-technical as it involves both social and technical changes that are likely to 
affect and replace established practices such as energy production, distribution and consumption.   
(5, 6, 7). Traditionally, electricity has been generated in large power stations and is distributed across 
a country (or even internationally) through a high voltage grid system. Electricity is then taken from 
this system and fed into a regional electric network infrastructure that supplies electricity to end users. 
This regional electricity network infrastructure is owned and managed by distribution network 
operators (DNOs). DNOs do not generate electricity; their responsibility is to ensure there is a reliable 
supply to all the domestic and non-domestic end users in their region and to do this in a cost-effective 
manner. Thus, in technical terms, distribution networks consist of, among other things, technical 
infrastructures situated between high voltage transmission grids and end users. When DNOs are 
faced with sustained increased demand for electricity, they would traditionally use engineering 
solutions to increase infrastructure capacity. This might include installing new power lines and building 
new substations. While such approaches to network management work well in a traditionally 
structured electricity distribution system, they do not fit emergent changes in the energy sector. Such 
changes include increased use of electricity for heating and transport as well as increased uptake of 
renewable and decentralised forms of energy production. These changes require more capacity in 
energy production and distribution as well as new forms of flexibility in the system such as energy 
storage and demand side interventions to avoid network failure. Thus, for a transition to flexible smart 
grids,   there needs to be the development and uptake of innovations that would not only involve a 
change in technology, but also changes in human relationships, which both constrain and enable 
socio-technical transitions. 
 
Developments of smart grids in the context of distribution networks include innovations to overcome 
network constraints where traditional network reinforcement is becoming expensive or inappropriate.  
A variety of technical approaches have been used to instrument, manage and control network 
infrastructure. Some include energy storage, such as battery packs, to serve peak demands or store 
surplus supply. A non-engineering smart grid measure is Demand Side Response (DSR), which is 
defined by Ofgem as the change in demand from a consumer in response to a price signal (9). In the 
UK, the National Grid has for a number of years used DSR to help manage peak loads on the national 
high voltage distribution system (10). At the regional distribution level DSR is in its infancy but is 
developing in various smart grid projects (11, 12, 13, 14). Here it can be used by DNOs to overcome 
network constraints (15). However, development of DSR is not without challenges. For supply side 
actors, such as DNOs, DSR is very different from how utilities in the energy sector typically manage 
network capacity. Traditional measures, such as network expansion, is upstream of the user’s 
electricity meter where infrastructure (e.g. electricity distribution networks) is specified and sized to 
meet demand.  Here, the engineered solutions to overcome network constraints are owned and 
entirely managed by the DNO itself. In contrast, DSR goes beyond the electricity meter into the 
premises of end users to reduce demand. A critical challenge associated with DSR therefore relates 
to its capacity to change practices of electricity demand (10). In such instances, rather than relying on 
the performance of assets that are controlled and owned by the DNO, capacity from DSR is acquired 
via commercial and contractual relationships. Thus, DSR can be regarded as an innovative method 
for managing assets that has very different institutional procedures compared with traditional and 
centralised arrangements of network reinforcement. Consequently, for DSR to develop and support 
low carbon and smart grid transitions, changes in the institutional arrangements that shape patterns of 
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electricity production, distribution and consumption are needed (16).  However, there is a paucity of 
research which explicates such institutional dynamics inherent with socio-technical change, which has 
to be considered to better understand development and uptake of DSR. This paper therefore 
addresses this gap in knowledge.  Focusing on the DSR on a distribution network, it casts DSR as 
primarily, but not exclusively, as an institutional innovation.  
 
Institutions are human relationships that structure opportunities via constraints and enablement (17). 
They provide order and predictability to social ‘everyday’ practices such as driving a car, forming a 
queue or indeed managing distribution networks. Seen in this way, institutional theory offers an 
approach to investigate how individuals or organisations shape and are shaped by social institutions, 
which in turn helps to create an understanding of how certain institutional arrangements develop and 
change (18, 19).  Here institutional theory founded upon notions of rational choice from neo-classical 
economics is avoided and the new institutional school which views institutions as cultural explanations 
of social and cultural phenomena is drawn upon.  Such theoretical perspectives have informed 
research on inter alia low carbon energy transitions (16) and sustainable consumption (cf. 20). For 
example, in the context of consumption, customer demand (e.g. mobility, comfort) is satisfied through 
material artefacts such as a car. In such instances, ownership and property rights constitute a 
dominant form of institution, where owning a car is a preferred institutional arrangement fulfilling the 
demand for mobility (ibid). This institutional perspective provides an understanding of how patterns of 
production and consumption are bounded by institutional settings in society and identifies institutional 
innovation as necessary for alternative and potentially more sustainable systems to come about.  
 
An institutional perspective on innovation relates to the process through which changes might occur in 
socially constructed rules that define and constrain everyday activities (21). Such a process involves 
multiple actors, including firms, industry associations and advocacy groups that are configured by 
their institutional environment; and engage in the transformation of institutional arrangements with 
different resources, justification principles and conflicting worldviews. Since DSR impacts upon 
multiple institutional environments such as DNOs, policy, end-users, and requires changes in these, 
this makes institutional theory an appropriate approach to explore developments of DSR. Research 
on DSR to date has focused on the role of certain key actors such as end users and system builders 
(cf. 22) who are important for the development of institutional arrangements required of DSR. 
However, little attention has been given to intermediary actors known as aggregators, who have been 
crucial in the development of DSR.  
 
Aggregators are commercial firms that operate in electricity markets. They act as third-party 
intermediaries that engage with commercial and non-domestic electricity users to provide demand 
side response services for electricity grid operators (e.g. the National Grid and DNOs) (9). They do 
this by aggregating DSR capacity from a number of non-domestic industrial and commercial 
customers (I&C customers hereafter) to provide network capacity for the DNO. Thus, aggregators are 
potentially important players in energy futures. The role of aggregators could change as smart grid 
technologies develop. For example, the development and uptake of energy storage as source of 
flexibility to balance supply and demand and overcome network constraints is likely to affect the 
aggregator business model. The development of energy storage is, however, another matter and is 
not considered in this study. Rather, this paper focuses on aggregators as intermediary agents 
situated in between DNOs and I&C customers mediating and facilitating development and uptake of 
DSR and begins to unpack their somewhat hidden work in smart grid developments.  
 
2 Theoretical perspective 
The work of aggregators does not fit neatly into discrete institutional environments (e.g. energy 
producer, network operator or users), but in between particular institutional settings, notably DNOs, 
grid infrastructures and end users. Institutional theory was therefore selected to analyse development 
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and uptake of DSR in energy sectors with a particular focus on the role of aggregators. This 
perspective identifies that institutions are the underlying rules of social activities, which guide what 
actors can and cannot do in particular situations (18, 19). Indeed, the availability of technical artefacts 
such as infrastructures also constrain and enables social activities, but institutions connects socio-
technical configurations that work and stabilises these (cf. 8).  Institutions are typically divided into 
formal and informal constraints (23). Formal constraints are the explicit rules that guide and constrain 
social activities, e.g. written policies and regulations. For instance, since DNOs are natural 
monopolies, their work is constrained by government regulations (e.g. the UK’s Ofgem’s RIIO-ED1 
price control scheme) that affects to some extent what they can and cannot do. Informal constraints 
are the implicit codes and conventions, including norms and values that are embedded in everyday 
life. For example, engineers working in the utility sectors tend to follow cognitive routines and 
conventions that lead them to look in particular directions and not in others to overcome network 
constraints (24). Thus, institutions play a key role in stabilising existing and developing new socio-
technical configurations (25; 26). Institutions are always developing, a process shaped by the 
availability of new technologies as well individual actors and their organisations (27; 28).        
 
Indeed, formal institutions, such as regulations that affect energy sectors, are changing. For instance, 
following the UK Energy Act 2013, the UK regulator, OFGEM, launched a capacity market for demand 
side measures (22). However, this does not mean that DSR has become a mainstream activity in 
energy sectors to address capacity constraints on electricity utility networks. Rather, it can be viewed 
as a niche activity in these sectors with potential to grow and become mainstream. Further uptake of 
DSR requires a change in the informal institutions of electricity production and consumption. For 
example, DSR requires particular sets of skills and competences to identify and engage end users in 
such arrangements. However, such skills and working practices may not be common within DNOs, 
possibly constraining the development of DSR. Thus, while institutional change is necessary it is 
particularly difficult to achieve change in informal institutions.   
 
Informal institutions are regarded as more pervasive, long lasting and difficult to change or move 
away from compared to formal institutions (29, 23). For example, while formal rules and regulations in 
the energy sector might change to support smart grid developments (e.g. DSR), informal institutions 
such as (cultural) routines that guide behaviour of social organisations (e.g. a DNO) can be harder to 
change. An institutional perspective recognises that change in formal institutions (e.g. regulations) is 
not sufficient to embed DSR in the institutional landscape. The potential for DSR to have significant 
impact on energy sectors is therefore not only constrained by existing regulations but also informal 
institutions, e.g. cultural routines and behaviour of actors operating in these sectors, including end 
users. Thus, following Jolly and Raven (30), institutional theory is useful to understand how 
innovations (e.g. DSR) might develop to become more embedded in energy sectors, i.e. develop into 
a more mainstream activity that is part of the broader institutional landscape. In this context, 
aggregators are identified as key social agents in shaping developments of DSR. As third-party 
intermediaries situated in-between a DNO and its customers, aggregators mediate and facilitate 
relationships between them, which is as an important aspect in development and uptake of DSR. 
Notably, this is because these actors have skills and competences lacking in DNOs to deploy DSR. 
Thus, we adopt the concept of intermediaries to understand the work of aggregators in shaping 
institutional arrangements of DSR.  
 
Following the work of Moss et al. (31), we understand intermediaries as social actors who work in-
between core actors (for example, producer and user, entrepreneurs and adopters) who make 
connections and enable a relationship between them. Intermediaries are far from neutral players, but 
are actively involved in ordering and defining relationships and as such act as mediators and 
facilitators of innovation and change. For instance, in an analysis of green electricity labelling 
schemes, Rohracher (32) investigates the role of intermediaries, notably nongovernmental 
organisations, to shift electricity markets toward a higher share of renewable energy resources. Here, 
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intermediation activities reframe energy markets by simultaneously shaping supply-side structures 
and as an agent that articulate and translate consumer preferences on demand side. In a related 
study, Janda and Parag (33) use the conceptual term ‘middle-actors’ (not ‘intermediaries’) to 
investigate the work of building professionals to improve energy performance in buildings. In contrast, 
to frame processes of social and technological innovation as top down or bottom up, they adopt a 
middle-out perspective that identifies building professionals as agents of change located in between 
top and bottom and has capacity to affect change upstream, downstream and sideways (33; 34)  
While this middle-out perspective brings important contribution to understand multi-scalar dynamics of 
innovation process, this paper adopts intermediary concept to understand the relational work in-
between institutional environments.  
 
A distinguishing feature in research on intermediaries is not the focus on organisational 
characteristics or form, but more specifically the work they perform. Thus, the work of intermediaries 
to influence innovation processes, so called innovation intermediaries, has gained traction in research 
on innovation and sustainability transition (35, 36). Here, a form of innovation intermediaries is one 
that is situated between producers and consumers where new technologies (e.g. low carbon 
technologies) require adjustment and re-innovation in particular locales in which they are adopted (c.f. 
35). In such instances, intermediaries can work to facilitate and configure new technology to suit local 
particularities. Indeed, we found the concept of intermediary to be a useful analytical label for 
conceptualising the work of aggregators in the context of DSR. However, this concept does not 
precisely help us analyse how aggregators inflect developments of DSR through their work in 
between institutional settings, notably DNO and end-users. To account for the work of intermediary 
actors (aggregators), an additional conceptual framework known as Access Mobility Receptivity 
(AMR) was identified from the technology transfer literature.    
 
AMR identifies innovation as an interactive process involving intermediaries who translate and 
redefine knowledge of a new technology to facilitate a tighter fit in the context in which it is to be 
deployed (37). Seen this way, the development and uptake of innovations (including institutional 
innovations such as DSR) constitute three interrelated processes: 
 
• Accessibility – Intermediaries make innovations accessible in conceptual and practical terms.  
Potential adopters who may be receptive to innovations are identified. Promotional materials 
about the innovation are developed accordingly. 
• Mobility –Innovations travel through intermediary channels in iterative fashion from the developer 
to potential adopters. Both the innovations and aspects of the potential adopters are considered 
and may be redeveloped in this process.   
• Receptivity –is the extent to which there exists adopters that has both a willingness (or 
disposition) and ability (or capability) to accept, absorb and utilise the innovation. 
 
Seen in this way, intermediaries assist in the development of receptivity to DSR initiatives by working 
in iterative fashion in the relational space between the DNO and I&C customer. Such processes may 
involve changing the DSR proposition and working with the I&C customer to redevelop their business 
practices to achieve receptivity. This analytical approach has informed research on developments of 
service innovations and product service systems (38, 39). In this paper, DSR represents an 
innovation that develops in the relational settings of DNOs and their customers. In this context, 
aggregators are viewed as important intermediary agents who perform entrepreneurial activities and 
create receptivity to DSR in relational settings. The key role that aggregators fulfil is that they 
‘aggregate’ together a number of I&C customers in order to be able to offer the National Grid or a 
DNO a particular amount of load or demand reduction at particular times. The aggregator has 
expertise to engage I&C customers to participate in a DSR programme, and in exchange takes a cut 
of the income involved. In this paper we focus specifically on how aggregators influence and shape 
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receptivity concerning DSR developments, which in turn shape and are shaped by institutional 
arrangements. How data were collected and analysed is considered in the next section.  
 
3 Method and analytical framework     
This study followed a case study research approach to collect and analyse data on the work of 
aggregators in DSR developments. A case study is an experimental inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially where the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (40). This approach was selected because 
DSR as a phenomenon cannot easily be separated from the contexts in which it is implemented. The 
setting selected to investigate development of DSR was the smart grids development Project 
FALCON (Flexible Approaches for Low Carbon Optimised Networks). Project FALCON, which ran 
from 2011 to 2015, was led by the British DNO, Western Power Distribution, and was part the UK 
government-funded smart grid programme funded through the Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF). 
The LCNF was established by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) and provides 
financial support for DNOs to develop and implement smart grid initiatives. Indeed, project FALCON 
led WPD to develop further DSR initiatives, and their relationship with aggregators has therefore also 
developed further since this project was completed in 2015. WPD has built a network of partnerships 
that generate income for I&C customers such as local businesses and allow DNOs to accommodate 
increasing demand for electricity without having to reinforce the grid. The role of aggregators in 
developing the skills and competencies explored in this paper remain of key relevance to the 
expansion of DSR practices in Smart Grid programmes. 
 
The authors role in project FALCON was to complete stakeholder engagement activities with trial 
participants, notably internal actors at the DNO, as well as external organisations such as aggregators 
and I&C customers involved in DSR trials. The relationship between the authors and the project led 
by the DNO enabled data to be collected for project reporting purposes as well as for research on a 
range of smart grid developments. Working in relationship with participants in the field being studied 
offers an opportunity for the researchers to engage with the experience, action and meaning of a 
phenomenon in context (41). However, such working relationships between researcher and field can 
at the same time involve a risk of the researcher being ‘captured’ by key informants (42).  The 
researchers can, for example, be influenced by social actors in the field in terms of what is perceived 
relevant, how it is interpreted as well as who they interact with or not, and consequently what voices 
are heard while silencing others. While there are no easy ways around these issues of collecting data 
via participatory methods, the authors have considered these implications as part of developing an in-
depth insight on the work of aggregators in the context of DSR drawing on data collected from project 
FALCON. Specifically, the researchers involved in the project followed ethical protocols and 
maintained a transparent but critical dialogue with project participants around research procedures.      
 
Consistent with the case study approach, qualitative data were collected from multiple sources using 
a variety of methods, notably participant observations (e.g. project meetings and industry related 
events), interviews and document reviews (43). Data were collected during the project trials that ran 
from autumn 2011 to autumn 2015. Specifically, data via observations were collected from two 
workshops organised by the researchers and involved participants from the FALCON project (e.g. 
project manager and consultants enrolled by WPD). The workshops focused on learning outcomes 
derived from project FALCON. Data were recorded via notes taken during the workshops, which were 
shared among the workshop participants and informed subsequent project reports. Data were also 
collected from reports on the FALCON project available in the public domain (cf. 44) and observations 
made from attending two events in which findings from the FALCON projects were presented to 
stakeholders. The first event was organised in London in 2014, where representatives from the DNO 
community disclosed information about their experience from developing and testing DSR in their 
LCNF funded smart grid projects. The second event was organised in 2015 by WPD and was held in 
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Milton Keynes, where information about the outcome from the DSR trials in FALCON were 
disseminated and discussed.   
 
Data via interviews were collected from project participants (aggregators, I&C customers as well as 
internal DNO staff) involved in the project trials. Interviewees were selected in dialogue with the 
project manager. A total of 12 interviews were completed and involved 8 senior managers working at 
aggregator firms, 2 network planners at the DNO and 2 I&C customers. The interviews were recorded 
and transcribed. The interview themes and questions were developed by the researchers in 
collaboration with the FALCON project manager. The interview themes and associated questions 
were developed to gain insights from key informants on:  
 
1) core business activities;  
2) experiences from participation in the FALCON trials;  
3) view on the developments of DSR.  
 
The purpose of the interviews was thus to collect data from participants involved in the trials, with 
particular reference to their roles and experience of the trials as well as views on DSR. These 
qualitative data were analysed during and after the project was completed using a flexible analytical 
template (45). The analytical template was developed using a funnel approach to facilitate analysis 
(46). The funnel approach refers to exploratory research that becomes more focused as research 
proceeds. Thus, we collected data about the smart grid initiative and simultaneously reviewed 
literature on smart grids with a particular focus on DSR, as well as literature on innovation studies. 
This enabled an analytical template to emerge from an interplay between data collected and literature 
reviewed.  
 
The analysis began with an initial focus on DSR as the phenomena.  As our research proceeded, we 
identified that DSR as a means to augment network management by shaping electricity demand was 
at odds with the existing institutional arrangements in this context. Thus, for DSR to develop, changes 
in the institutional arrangements that shape patterns of electricity production, distribution and 
consumption would be needed. Therefore, an institutional perspective was adopted to analyse 
development and uptake of DSR since institutions play a key role in stabilising existing socio-technical 
configurations as well as for developing new ones. Following this perspective, institutions are always 
developing and shaped by the availability of new technologies as well individual actors and their 
organisations. This enabled us to identify aggregator firms as key intermediary players in shaping 
development of DSR. The AMR framework was then adopted to account for the work of aggregators 
in creating receptivity to DSR in this relational setting. Thus, the analytical template consists of: 1) 
DSR as an institutional innovation that is very different from established arrangements to augment 
asset management on regional distribution networks; 2) Aggregators working as intermediary 
agents situated in between DNOs and customers, working back and forth, and; 3) Aggregators 
creating receptivity to DSR in these relational settings. This analytical template helped to transform 
rich and complex data into meaningful interpretations.  
 
4 Analysis  
Similar to many other smart grid initiatives in the LCNF programme (c.f. 47, 48, 49) the aim of 
FALCON was to identify better ways to manage the 11 kV electricity distribution network. Western 
Power Distribution (WPD) is the DNO in this region and the principal actor in the FALCON smart grid 
project. DNOs are generally engineering focused firms that specialise in managing large scale 
electricity infrastructure assets. Operating and maintaining a safe and robust electricity network and to 
ensure security of supply to customers is a key priority for a DNO. As was noted in the introduction to 
this paper, reinforcing distribution network assets is the main way DNOs address increased demand 
and peaks on the network, which is both guided and constrained by complex sets of formal and 
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informal institutions. Informal institutions include (cultural) routines that enable and constrain social 
action. For example, the notion of “predict and provide” is a well -established approach in utility asset 
management. Formal institutions include explicit rules developed by, amongst others, Ofgem, which is 
the regulator for gas and electricity markets in the UK and which determines what DNOs can and 
cannot do on their networks.  
 
The purpose of developing and implementing DSR trials in the FALCON project was to test how DSR 
can be deployed as a routinized and formalised approach to help manage the distribution network 
(42). There are principally two ways for customers to provide DSR capacity: 
  
1) load reduction, which means that a customer responds to a request from the DNO to avoid 
performing a practice that requires electricity at a particular time. For example, at times of 
peak electricity demand, non-essential electrical equipment could be turned down or off. An 
example of this might be a water company turning off some reservoir pumps for half an hour, 
or air conditioning paused in an office block.   
2) distributed generation, which means that a customer uses their own electricity generator to 
maintain practices that require electricity thus reducing their electricity take from the grid. For 
example, a number of organisations that require uninterrupted electricity supplies have 
backup generators. These could be used to also provide a DSR service.  
  
In contrast to engineered solutions, DSR initiatives aim to change demand and involve commercial 
relationships between the DNO and its I&C customers. In this analysis, DSR is therefore 
conceptualised as a socio-technical innovation that that require new forms of institutional 
arrangements to become more established as mainstream activity in the energy sector.    
 
4.1 DSR conceptualised as institutional innovation 
The market for DSR in the UK electricity sector became established when the National Grid began to 
use aggregator services to balance electricity supply and demand on the transmission network via 
programmes such as Short-Term Operating Reserve (STOR). Here, DSR can be described in terms 
of formal and informal institutional aspects, as it involves legal contracts between the National Grid 
and DSR providers as well as established routines for deployment of DSR. However, DSR is a 
marginal approach for the National Grid and used at a very small scale compared to other balancing 
measures, e.g. large-scale stand-by power generators. An aggregator summarised this situation as: 
 
So, demand response is like a new layer of opportunity to better use renewables to better get the 
energy efficiency objective and at the end to review CO2, at the end it is much less costly than build 
renewable plants or build generation or nuclear (Aggregator 3). 
 
As stated by aggregator 3, DSR is novel and has potential to be more cost effective than providing 
additional generating capacity. Thus, the role of aggregators is to aggregate demand reduction as 
illustrated by the quote below: 
 
What we are trying to do is to aggregate demand reduction from many industrial and commercial 
facilities and the sort of call that virtual power plant or virtual avoidance pool, we can sell to National 
Grid as part of the balancing services (Aggregator 2). 
 
At the regional distribution network level (networks covering 11kV to 132kV), formal institutional 
arrangements for DSR, similar to that of STOR, do not exist.  There are, however, some informal 
arrangements where DNOs request I&C customers to turn down load to avoid network failure. Thus, 
while forms of DSR already exists in terms of formal and informal institutional arrangements in the 
electricity sector (such as the National Grid and DNOs), it is not used as a regular and formal activity 
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by DNOs. The DSR trials in the FALCON project (and other LCNF projects) can therefore be viewed 
as an exploration that might lead to further uptake of DSR on regional networks. This means that DSR 
may become more widely adopted by actors in the electricity sector (e.g. DNOs) to form part of their 
asset management routines.  Aggregators are identified as important players in facilitating DSR 
developments as depicted by one aggregator:   
 
“It is actually acting as a bridge in between you know it is a matter of understanding what the National 
Grid or DNO or the supplier want. So, there is a role acting as a bridge with the client to such that the 
client say okay, how the client can deliver something that can meet the grid, or the DNO requirement. 
So, there is that sort of role of interpreter, translator, the bridge, that is sort of role as we have it at the 
moment” (Aggregator 5) 
 
As illustrated by the quote above, aggregators are working as intermediary agents building human 
relationships between utility firms (e.g. DNO) and end-user with DSR capacity. How such 
relationships develop forms the focus in the next.   
 
4.2 The role of aggregators working as intermediary agents 
The participation of I&C customers is necessary for DSR to work effectively. Ways of engaging with 
and recruiting them to DSR programmes is therefore central to development and uptake of DSR. This 
was also the case in the FALCON project, where recruitment of participants in DSR formed an 
important aspect to investigate since this is not a skill familiar to DNOs. Engaging with customers to 
engage them in DSR schemes is an important role familiar to aggregators as were noted by 
aggregator 1.  
 
“You have to engage with users on that network in order to get them to turn down. So it really steps 
outside the box for DNO because it is not a natural space to be in as a DNO” (Aggregator 1) 
 
A number of organisations were recruited by aggregators to participate in the FALCON trials (44). 
These organisations were located in the Milton Keynes trial area and were characterised as large 
electricity users with very different operations and activities e.g. water treatment and supply, 
education, district heating and health care. A common characteristic across these organisations was 
that they had embedded electricity generation on their sites (e.g. diesel generators) which were 
installed as back up generation but could also be used to provide DSR. However, the appropriateness 
of using diesel generators for the purpose of DSR can be challenged on the grounds of air quality and 
carbon reduction objectives. This is a common type of DSR capacity and was at the time seen as a 
valid source for this trial, but should DSR become more widespread, then the issue of the type or 
even use of generators would need addressing. This is a point acknowledged by this aggregator.  
 
Our focus is on automatic response not in stand by generation. So, we use stand by generation as a 
second guess, but we think that stand by generation, so using diesel generators with CO impact, it’s 
not the way ahead, okay. There is much more to do on the demand response side on trying to load 
shed, load shift or even disconnect their loads during a period of time so getting energy savings at 
buildings (Aggregator 2).    
 
Working as intermediary agents, aggregators saw they played an important role in developing a 
relationship with demand side organisations and recruiting them for the DSR trials in FALCON. In 
building such relationships, aggregators constructed persuasive and pervasive commercial 
propositions that rendered DSR a valid energy management initiative that accorded with an 
organisation’s business priorities, e.g. revenue stream, cost savings, carbon management and 
Corporate Social Responsibility agenda. As illustrated below, this is a process that takes time and 
requires skill in developing the relationship.  
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And, of course, when we go, you know, we need a very compelling value proposition and that is how 
we build relationships. We got there and say look, this is the value proposition, this is what it will do in 
terms of money and carbon reduction strategies and towards a kind of sustainable future, and you 
need to work on them, but it will take time because we can’t instantly, you know, these are not very 
sort of sophisticated energy people, they are very sophisticated on other things but not in terms of 
energy (Aggregator 2). 
 
Thus, aggregator make DSR accessible to organisations with DSR capacity in conceptual and 
practical terms. Here, conceptual terms relates to DSR and associated value propositions. In practical 
terms, aggregators develop technological capabilities to ensure DSR services. One way to acquire 
technological capability is via relationships with firms that have such capability as illustrated by the 
quote from Aggregator 2 below:   
 
We have a partnership agreement with Technology Firm just for the technology platform, they have 
got, you know, the technology platform that we need to be able to automatically aggregate all these 
loads in different buildings (Aggregator 2).  
 
This shows that aggregators build and maintains multiple relationships to make DSR work. This 
includes, for instance, relationships with end users and firms with technological capabilities needed 
for DSR. Furthermore, they also develop relationship with utility firms to translate and redefine DSR 
for them. A key priority for a DNO is to ensure security of electricity distribution. The aggregators in 
this project worked closely with the DNO to design and test commercial relationships between the 
DNO and I&C customers with particular focus on DSR as a reliable solution to ensure network 
capacity. Prototype contracts were therefore developed by aggregators in this project to make DSR a 
more reliable asset management approach and included, for instance, the planning of DSR events. 
The DNOs and their customers preferred DSR activities to be scheduled in advance, specifying the 
number, time and date for DSR events when they knew peak loads occurred. To facilitate the 
management of DSR activities, the aggregators had installed equipment on their clients’ site to 
monitor such activities. In some instance, equipment to control DSR activities were installed which 
enabled the aggregator to control aspects of their clients DSR capacity.  
In planning DSR events, it was also found useful to avoid competition between DSR programmes on 
the market. Since the National Grid uses DSR to balance the transmission network that covers 
multiple regional distribution networks, the National Grid and the DNOs may have to compete for DSR 
capacity. This competition in the market is illustrated by this quote:  
So, what we are looking to do is, so we will put the contract in place for the client and then it is, we will 
look at the opportunities available from DNOs and other opportunities from triad, from the National 
Grids other programmes (Aggregator 5). 
At the time when data were collected for this study, aggregators were negotiating with both National 
Grid and DNOs to develop codes of conducts for DSR (c.f. 50). This includes for example to ensure 
that DSR can develop on regional distribution networks without conflicting with DSR programmes on 
the National Grid level. This was emphasised in one aggregator response:  
“So, the approach that needs to be there is actually recognising multiple contributions rather than I am 
claiming this asset for me. So how can we set up some arrangement that means that the action of the 
response or the flexibility that is there is able to be used as many participants as possible in a 
coordination” (aggregator 4) 
While the National Grid can use DSR from any part of the grid connected to the transmission network, 
distribution networks are geographically constrained by their regional remit. This raises issues 
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concerning the viability of using DSR at this level. Perhaps the most significant aspect is the 
geographical scale of deploying DSR on the distribution network. In the FALCON trials, DSR was 
tested on the local 11kV network. At this geographical scale there were few clusters of large electricity 
consumers with DSR capacity. Thus, it was recognised in this trial that DSR may be more successful 
at a larger network scale (e.g. at the 33 kV and 132 kV networks), where DSR can be sourced from a 
larger geographical area with a greater number of electricity customers with DSR capacity. 
Furthermore, the cost of reinforcing distribution networks differs between scales. In general terms, the 
cost of reinforcing distribution networks increases with voltage levels: the cost is relatively low at 11kV 
and increases at higher voltage levels. Deploying DSR at the 33kV or 132 kV networks may therefore 
be more commercially viable for a DNO.  
Having analysed the role of aggregators working as intermediary agents, this analysis shows that 
aggregators go back and forward between the DNO and its customers brokering relationships 
between them. It is through this process of working as intermediaries that aggregators create 
accessibility, mobility and receptivity to DSR, which in turn shapes developments of DSR in this 
context.       
4.3 Aggregators creation of receptivity to DSR  
Aggregators create receptivity to DSR by constructing persuasive and pervasive propositions for its 
users, DNOs and, in particular, I&C customers. They do so by negotiating DSR arrangements with 
these users by translating and redefining the notion of DSR to make it fit with multiple contexts (e.g. 
the DNO), the regional distribution networks and on the premises of customers. For example, 
aggregators construct propositions for how DSR can effectively work for DNOs in terms of a reliable 
asset management approach. They also construct commercial propositions that renders DSR a valid 
energy management initiative which accords with an organisation’s business priorities.  
It is through this process of translating and redefining the notion of DSR that aggregators create 
receptivity for DSR; that is the willingness and ability of DNOs and customers to use DSR. 
    
Aggregators have knowledge and skills relevant for creating receptivity for DSR. They also have 
technical capabilities in terms of monitoring and control equipment necessary for executing DSR 
events. Technological capability is important for DNOs, as it helps to ensure that DSR generates a 
valid and reliable asset management approach. It can also be seen as a service for organisations with 
DSR capacity not having to manage DSR events themselves. DSR is a relatively low-income 
generating activity for these organisations, which is not worth the cost of setting up inhouse expertise. 
With DSR skills and expertise provided at scale by the aggregator, participation becomes 
economically viable. 
 
From the viewpoint of the DNO, aggregators also have competences and skills required to identify 
suitable I&C customers and establish contractual relationships with these to provide DSR capacity to 
DNOs. In brokering such relationships, aggregators engender receptivity to DSR among I&C 
customers. One aggregator noted the importance of such skills: 
 
Ultimately that is part of the kind of skill set, that if a DNO wants to go directly they will have to 
develop that skill set. There is no sales department located within distribution networks (Aggregator 1) 
 
Since the completion of Project FALCON, WPD has continued to develop its DSR capability (51). The 
competences developed through previous trials have been used to design a DSR proposition that is 
viable for both the DNO and their commercial customers. This has involved WPD building a network 
of partnerships that generate income for I&C customers such as local businesses and allow DNOs to 
accommodate increasing demand for electricity without having to reinforce the grid. Aggregators 
remain part of this network, but their role is changing as DSR moves towards becoming a standard 
practice. In Project FALCON, WPD needed the aggregators to provide the skills and understanding to 
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deliver DSR capacity. At that time, they had very little of this in-house. At this early stage, DSR was a 
minor niche activity around which the aggregators had developed as service companies to National 
Grid and the DNOs. 
 
Additionally, aggregators are contributing to developments of codes of conduct associated with DSR, 
which is relevant to growing the DSR market and preventing conflict between demand for DSR on the 
distribution network and the National Grid (50). Thus, by translating and redefining DSR to become 
attractive to I&C customers as well as utility firms, aggregators contribute to the development of 
human relationships as well as relationships between humans and technology, and thus to the 
institutionalisation of DSR. In this way, aggregators consolidate and extend these arrangements to 
better establish DSR, particularly on the electricity distribution networks. Hence, aggregators can be 
viewed as important innovation intermediaries influencing development of DSR. As more utility firms 
(notably DNOs) and their customers participate in DSR programmes, it could become more 
embedded in the energy market as a valid and legitimate form of asset management. 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Through the lens of institutional theory, this paper has shown the important role of aggregators now 
and in future developments of DSR. Our findings identify DSR as an institutional innovation where 
aggregators work with DNOs to shape demand to augment network management. Exploratory case 
study research was conducted on the DSR trials within the LCNF funded smart grid project FALCON, 
undertaken in Milton Keynes and led by the regional DNO. I&C customers connected to the regional 
distribution network can provide DSR by reducing the amount of electricity they take from the grid for 
which they are financially compensated. The LCNF funded FALCON project created a window of 
opportunity for developing and testing DSR in the context of regional distribution networks and to 
identify the institutional relationships required for DSR to become a mainstream practice on these 
networks. The DSR trials in the FALCON project (and other LCNF projects) can therefore be viewed 
as experimental steps towards further uptake of DSR on regional networks.  
 
Institutionally, implementing DSR represents something very different from more established forms of 
the electricity industry’s asset management approaches of conventional reinforcement. A notable 
difference between conventional reinforcement and DSR is that network capacity is acquired via 
commercial and contractual relationships rather than ownership and property rights. Asset 
management involving contractual arrangements are, arguably, a weaker form of institution compared 
to the latter. First, they require customers to participate in DSR programmes. Second, they exist only 
for the duration of the contracts involved. Third, DSR does not match well with the institutional 
arrangements in the utility sector that are geared towards engineering solutions to enhance network 
capacity. Thus, change in such institutional arrangements are needed for DSR to work and 
aggregators are identified as important actors to inflect such developments.   
 
Aggregators work with utility firms (e.g. DNOs, the National Grid) and I&C customers with DSR 
capacity brokering relationships between them. Specifically, aggregators identify potential adopters 
such as DNOs and I&C customers who are both able and willing to adopt DSR as part of their 
organisational remit. However, the ability and willingness of DNOs and their customers to adopt DSR 
is not necessarily something that is ‘there’ to tap into. Rather, receptivity is constructed in the contexts 
in which DSR can be used. Here, aggregators create receptivity by constructing persuasive and 
pervasive commercial propositions that render DSR a valid energy management initiative that accords 
with an organisation’s business priorities and institutional arrangements. For example, aggregators 
engage with organisations that have back-up generation on their premises and thus have ability to 
provide DSR capacity and offers a financial compensation to them which makes DSR a potential 
business proposition. They also construct prototype contracts that engender DSR a reliable and valid 
asset management approach that accord with a DNOs priorities, e.g. security of electricity distribution. 
13 
 
Additionally, aggregators are contributing to developments of codes of conducts associated with DSR, 
which is relevant to growing the DSR market. This includes, for example, to ensure that DSR can 
develop on distribution networks without conflicting with more established DSR arrangements 
developed with the National Grid. In such instance, aggregators work as intermediaries to align DSR 
programmes at different network levels, notably National Grid and regional network levels. In this way, 
working as intermediaries, aggregators facilitate a tighter fit between DSR and the context in which it 
is to be deployed. 
 
In this paper we have identified the work of aggregators to be important for DSR developments. 
Notably, working as intermediaries, aggregators builds relationships between humans and technology 
and create receptivity to DSR, which contributes to the institutionalisation of this innovation. They do 
this by translating and redefining DSR to make it accessible and attractive to actors on the energy 
market including I&C customers as well as utility firms. In translating and redefining DSR to fit multiple 
contexts, aggregators consolidate and extend these arrangements making DSR better established on 
the energy market and in particular on the electricity distribution networks. As more utility firms 
(notably DNOs) and their customers participate in DSR programmes, DSR has moved to become 
more embedded on the energy market as a valid and legitimate form of asset management. WPD 
now regards DSR as having moved from being a trail to rolling it out as part of their ‘business as 
usual’ (51). As such, the skills and role of the aggregator appear to be moving in-house to WPD, with 
the aggregators providing more specialist input. This illustrates that the role of an intermediary in 
transitions changes as the transition progresses. Thus, this paper contributes with insights on 
aggregators in DSR developments and identifies their work as intermediaries to be important for 
transition to smart grid futures. Specifically, it suggests that institutional perspectives can help reveal 
the work of intermediaries brokering relationships between institutional environments and facilitating 
new institutional arrangements. How power play proceeds in such processes is, however, 
underdeveloped and could therefore form the basis for further research.      
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